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IMPARTIAL  
OBSERVATIONS  
ON THE  
PUBLIC AFFAIRS  
OF  
GREAT BRITAIN.

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(Price One Shilling.)

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ON THE  
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OF  
GREAT BRITAIN

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(Price One Shilling)

*Carton of Rogers*

IMPARTIAL

# OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

PUBLICK AFFAIRS

OF

*GREAT BRITAIN,*

*and Ireland*

FROM THE

Time of the Conclusion of the  
Treaty of *Vienna*, down to the  
Continuance of the 12000 *Hes-*  
*sian* Troops in the Pay of *Great*  
*Britain* for the Year 1731.

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L O N D O N:

Printed for the Author, and sold by the Book sellers  
in Town and Country. M,DCC,XXXI.

926

IMPARTIAL

# OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

PUBLIC AFFAIRS

OF

THE GREAT BRITAIN

46

FROM THE

47

Time of the Conclusion of the  
Treaty, down to the  
Continuation of the 1800. Has  
been Troops in the Bay of  
Britain for the Year 1791.



L O N D O N

Printed for the Author, and sold by the Booksellers  
in Town and Country. MDCCLXXI.





TO THE  
READER.

**T**HE many, and indeed unaccountable *Encomiums* that were given by some, and disallow'd by others, concerning a Pamphlet, or more properly a *LIBEL*, entitl'd, *Considerations on the present State of Affairs*, &c. and being creditably inform'd that a very large Number of them had been dispers'd among the principal Officers of the most publick Employ in *Great-Britain*, in order that by their Substitutes the said Pamphlet or *Libel* might be spread among the Common People, incited my Curiosity to purchase one of them at the Price

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of

ii      *To the READER.*

of One Shilling, and my serious perusal of it gave Birth to the following Pages.

I declare upon the *Bona fide*, not of a *French* but of an *Englishman*, that I am no *Party-Man*: That I have no Employment under the Government, or expect any; that I am intirely in the Interest of my Country, and have no personal Pique against the *Ministry*.

But when I find that Persons, who act upon *honest* Principles, void of any private or self-interested Views, are attacked with the most glaring Marks of Infamy; when I perceive that they, who stand up *boldly* (as every *True Briton* ought to do) in Defence of the Rights and Properties of their Fellow-Subjects; I say, when these Persons are stigmatized with the opprobrious Names of *Pretended Patriots*, *Beuntefeu's*, and *Enemies* to the Government; it behoves, and is the

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*To the* READER      iii

the immediate Concern of every Person who is capable of declaring his Sentiments to the World, to vindicate themselves, and detect the *artful* Insinuations, false Reasonings, and equivocal Misrepresentations of those who endeavour to be esteemed *real* Patriots, when at the same time they are no better Friends to *Great Britain* than the *Hessians*; that is, any longer than they are paid for what they do.

If I were inclinable to Cavil, I might easily demonstrate that the Title of the abovementioned Pamphlet is a *Misnomer*; but I scorn to insist upon *Bagatels*; however, I will affirm that it is written, not so much with a View to vindicate some Measures that have been taken in respect to the Conduct of certain Persons, or rather of *a certain Person*, as to persuade and *wire-draw* the People of *Great Britain* into a Reasonableness and a Compliance

iv To the READER.

pliance with a *Continuando* of the *Hessian* Troops now supported, and for the future (which no Body knows how long) to be paid with *British* Money; that we may find them like *Taylor*s, at a *House of Call*, when we may have occasion to employ them. And yet at the same time that we have *disbanded* our own Forces, and are reducing others, because they were not born to be *Great Men*; I mean, that they are under the size of Five foot nine or ten Inches, tho' they are disciplined and experienced in the Art of War; yet these very *Hessians* are continued, and our own Subjects left to shift for themselves.

They have been so long out of Trade that they have in a manner forgot what they learned when they were Apprentices; but what still enhances their Calamities, I am sorry to say I have too much reason to mention it, is, that the People  
of



*To the* READER. V

of *Britain* will scarce employ a Person who has been in the *Army*; for such is their groundless Enmity to *Soldiers*, tho' they are sensible they could not have their Properties and Privileges secured to them, except the *Soldiery* were ready at an Hour's warning to defend and protect them. *Experto credo*. And as this is the Case, what must these unhappy Men do? If they cannot earn their Bread at home, they must enter themselves into the Service of Foreigners; and as Necessity will oblige Nature to act against Principle, can these Men be blamed if they are thereby compelled to draw their Swords, and point them where they, who pay them, shall direct? I do not approve, encourage or vindicate such Measures; and yet I own I would rather defend than advise such a Proceeding.

This,

VI *To the* R E A D E R.

This, you see, is the miserable Condition of our poor disbanded Soldiers; they are brought to such a Dilemma, that they must starve or rot in a Jail, except they enter into Measures directly opposite to their Inclinations, and to the Welfare and Prosperity of their native Country; while the *Hessians*, the favourite *Hessians*, sit peaceably under their own Vines, eating the Bread of other Mens Industry, and remaining in Sloth and Idleness.

There is Scope enough to enlarge upon this and many other Topicks in the Pamphlet; which I do not look upon to be written with the *same Pen*, because several Paragraphs are very *artfully* managed, and others displayed so openly and incautiously, that Persons of the most ordinary Genius or Capacity, will at one single View discover their Absurdities.

Nay,

*To the READER.* vii

Nay, take off their Varnish, and then see what a Figure they will make in their native Nakedness; a Figure the most ununiformed that ever appeared in the World.

It may reasonably be expected that I should say something in Defence of the following Paragraphs; and therefore not to tire my Readers, I shall only declare, by way of Apology for the unpoliteness of the Stile, and perhaps some Deficiencies, that they were snatched from me before I had time to peruse them, or read them after they were penned; but as a *Lapsus Pennæ*, as well as a *Lapsus Linguae*, *non est error Mentis*, I am persuaded that every unprejudiced Person, into whose Hands this little Pamphlet shall fall, will make an Allowance, and forgive Repetitions which could not be avoided;

viii *To the* READER

avoided; being obliged to follow  
my *Leader* as close as I possibly  
could do; he having the Liberty  
to rove any where, and I con-  
fined to a particular Latitude.



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the preservation of the Peace and Balance of  
Europe, independent of any other Interest or  
Consideration whatever.



# OCCASIONAL REMARKS

On a late

## LIBEL.



HAVING carefully perused and considered a Pamphlet, which I think may very justly be stiled a Libel, called, *Considerations on the present State of Affairs in Europe, &c.* I find that the main Drift of the Author is to inculcate into the Minds of the People, and more particularly the Members of the *House of Commons*, the Necessity of continuing the *Hessian* Troops, to the Number of *Twelve thousand*, in *British* Pay: And this he declares to be a wise, just and necessary Measure, in consequence of Treaties made for the Interest of *Great Britain*, and

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the preservation of the Peace and Balance of *Europe*, independent of any other Interest or Consideration whatever.

If this Assertion were literally true, no Man would oppose the continuation of those Troops, or repine at their having been maintained at our Expence for some Years past; tho' by the bye, it would have been very satisfactory, if the Writer of that Pamphlet had explained himself in relation to the *Balance of Power*, and told where it does or where it shall subsist.

He lays it down as a *Postulatum*, that there was such a thing as the Treaty of *Vienna*, but gives us no further Proof of it than a bare *ipse dixit*; and this is the Foundation upon which he raises his superstructure, declaring that at the same time various Intrigues and Projects were set on foot in favour of the Pretender. It would have been kind in him, and I think no way impolitick, if he had mentioned any of those *Intrigues* and *Projects*.

However, he tells us, that undoubted Evidences in Facts of concerted Designs against the Interest of this Nation, arising from that Treaty, (without producing one single Instance) gave Birth to the Treaty of *Hanover* between *England*, *France* and *Prussia*; but that the Emperor had found means to detach the latter from the *Hanover* Treaty, who has a standing Army of Seventy thousand Men. From hence he seem to deduce one material Reason

Reason for keeping on foot the *Hessian* Troops; that is, as far as can be gathered from his Words and Suggestions, the Twelve thousand *Hessians* are to watch the Motions of and to be a check upon the *Prussians*, in case their King should attack the *Dutch*. This sure is the weakest Argument that could enter into any Man's Head; it is absurd in its nature; as if Twelve thousand Men were a Match for Seventy thousand Veteran Troops.

An Alliance between *France* and *England* may very justly be questioned to be natural on many Accounts; for we know she has bore a mortal hatred to *England* ever since she was conquered by an *English* King, and will continue her hatred as long as she sees her Arms quartered with ours, and while our Monarchs stile themselves Kings or Queens of *France*; from which, as it is their Birth-right, I hope they will never recede. Besides, have we not the most substantial Reasons in the World to suspect her firm Adherence to us? for tho' she has often put on the Veil of Friendship, she never persevered in her *bona fide* any longer than it was compatible with her Interest.

To this purpose he leads his Reader to the 13th Page of his Book, and tells him, that the vigorous and warlike Preparations of those Powers, viz. *Germany*, *Spain* and *Muscovy*, did naturally oblige the *Hanover* Allies (observe that our new Friend *France* was one) to concert proper Measures for their mutual Defence, &c. We all know what must fol-

low from thence, an increase of Ships and Seamen, and consequently extraordinary Expences, which was agreed to by an Address of the House of Commons the 23th of March, 1726. not only to increase the Number of Seamen, but to consult such other Measures as would best conduce to the Security of the Trade and Navigation of this Kingdom, and the preservation of the Peace of Europe, &c. But I am apt to think, that in this Address to his late Majesty, the Parliament little imagined that Twelve thousand Hessians should be hired with English Money for any longer time than one Year; and perhaps many Gentlemen in the House were then aware of such a Precedent, not knowing what immense Sums it might cost England before those Troops were dismissed.

However, a Contract was made with the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel to have such a Number of Men ready to march for his Majesty's Service upon demand, France likewise increased her Forces, the States General acceded to the Hanover Alliance, and the Dutch thereupon immediately proceeded to an Augmentation of their Troops, but required at the same time that England and France should have their respective Quota's of Twelve thousand Men, in readiness and at hand for the Defence of the Republick in Case of an immediate Attack. From hence we see that the Dutch, who owe their Preservation and Riches to the Friendship of England, were resolved to make a sure Bargain for themselves, otherwise they would not chime in with



with our Measures; so that they have not over-gratefully repaid our former Kindnesses and good Turns to us, who from *poor distressed States* (as they formerly stiled themselves, when they became Suppliants to *England* for Protection and Assistance) have raised them to *High and Mighty*. I always looked upon the *Dutch* to be a cunning and artful People; and it is evident that they know how to procure Profit and Advantage to themselves by Treaties as well as by Traffick.

But the Author of this Libel, for I cannot call it any thing else with a safe Conscience, says, *that this Proviso was an equitable Demand on the Part of the States, and that it could not have been answered by the King, if he had raised no Troops but in England*. I believe that the major part of the People of *England* are of a contrary Opinion, and would have been infinitely better satisfied, if the like Number of our own Troops had been raised, who have certainly a better Claim to their Country's Money, and might reasonably be supposed to do her more Service than Foreigners. The Author seems to be aware of this Reply, and endeavours to avoid it, by saying, *the Dutch are too well acquainted with the Accidents of the Sea, and the Difficulties and Delays which attend the transporting great Bodies of Troops, to depend upon such help in a Case, which if it happened at all, would be sudden and too quick to be withstood by slow Movements*. The View of this made it necessary to have foreign Troops, i. e. Hessians, properly placed. I would desire to know if the Accidents of the Sea were  
greater

greater at that time than they were during the late Wars in *Flanders*? I may affirm that the contrary is apparent, and yet we furnished our Quota's while those Wars continued, by Detachments from our parts; so that this part of his Argument *falls* to the *Ground*; and as for the Difficulties and Delays, they must needs share the same fate, if it be considered that if we kept up Twelve thousand Men in readiness to march upon demand, they might be transported and arrive in *Holland* sooner than Orders could be sent to the *Hessians* to march, and that they could come up to the Place appointed. But why should the *Dutch* be under any Apprehensions of a sudden attack from the King of *Prussia*, except they provoked him to it? For tho' he withdrew himself from the Treaty of *Hanover*, yet it does not appear that he entered into an Alliance with the *Emperor* to fall upon the *Dutch*, which the Author would have used as a main Argument for hiring those *Hessians*, if there had been the least shew or pretence for it; and there is as little reason to expect it at this time of Day. But if there were any apprehension of Danger from that Side, surely Twelve thousand *British* Troops are more eligible than so many *Hessians*.

As the Writer of this seditious Piece has not made it apparent that the Forces raised by the contracting Parties, in consequence of the *Vienna* Treaty, as he calls it, were directly levelled at the Interest of *Great Britain*, he may very well ask what she had to do

do with the String of foreign Troops, and what we had to apprehend from the Forces of *Prussia*, *Muscovy* and the *Emperor*? I have already given an Answer to the first, *viz.* *Prussia*; and I think there was not, nor is there, any thing to be apprehended from the second; for *Muscovy* has a sufficient need of all her own Troops, and cannot spare any to assist another Person, or, if she were so inclined, she would find it no easy Matter to obtain a Passage for Thirty thousand Men through another Prince's Dominions: Such a formidable Body of Troops would scarce be trusted in the Territories of any Potentate, though the pretence of their March were ever so specious. As for the *Emperor*, he would have found Employment enough for his Troops without attacking the *Dutch*; and therefore if we had lain by a-while, I do not see any Prejudice that would have accrued from thence.

But, says the Author, *this would have been a plausible Doctrine if the Possessions of Gibraltar and Port Mahon, if the Trade to Italy and Spain, to the East and West Indies, and the Baltick; if the Balance of Europe, and the present happy Establishment, were become indifferent Things to this Nation, &c.* Mark, how the present happy Establishment is hooked in: This is done either to amuse the incautious part of the People, or to prevent an Answer, by supposing the latter cannot be done without running a great hazard; however we will venture to speak our Minds with becoming freedom.

Supposing

Supposing then that by the Treaty of *Vienna* the *Emperor* and the *King of Spain* had entered into the firmest Alliance imaginable, and that the Union could not be dissolved; does it therefore follow from thence that we must have given up *Gibraltar* and *Port Mahon*? What assistance could *Spain* have expected from the *Emperor* sufficient to retake those Places? His Power by Sea is so trifling and insignificant that it is not worth mentioning, nor could he have spared Forces to succour such an Enterprize; but though it might have been prejudicial to our Trade with *Spain* and *Italy* for a-while, and have embarrassed our *West India* Trade, yet the two former would have quickly felt the want of our Trade with them, as we should have the loss on our Side; and therefore Interest would have obliged them to have opened a Commerce with us in a short time.

As to our Trade of the *West Indies*, we could not have suffered more than we have done since the Dissolution of that Treaty, as it is called, which I shall have occasion to speak of hereafter; But I would willingly be informed how it could have effected our Commerce in *East India* or the *Baltick*? We are, and I hope shall always remain superiors at Sea; and I never heard that they have any Settlements in the *East*, from whence we can apprehend the least Danger. The *Ostenders* are but an upstart Company, and as they must necessarily pass by our Doors, it is our own fault, and we might justly be deemed



deemed remiss in our Duty and Interest of our Country, if we permitted such Interlopers to proceed. But I must return, and speak one Word or two in relation to the *West Indies*: I own that the *Spaniards* have a Situation there, which may easily incommode us, but not ruin our Trade; for if they were not able to effect such a thing when they had the Assistance of such a Maritime Power as *France*, I may confidently affirm that an Union with the *Emperor* would have been of less signification: Now admitting they interrupted our Trade in and to these Parts, could we not have made Reprisals by intercepting their Galleons? Or supposing that we only obliged them to keep within their Harbours, what could *Spain* do for want of the annual Revenues that are brought from thence?

He seems to lay a great Stress upon our Trade to the *Baltick*, intimating, that we must have been great Sufferers in that Point, if the before-mentioned Union had not been dissolved. I do not see that we have gained any thing by that Dissolution in respect of this Affair; and we may be said to be Sufferers in one sense, by sending strong Squadrons thither: And, I hope, our not being molested in our Trade to those Parts, is not owing to the Twelve thousand *Hessians*, which are maintained by us in a state of Inactivity.

How comes it into the Head of the Author of the before-mentioned Libel, to insinuate

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that

that the present happy Establishment is become a thing indifferent to the Nation? This is altogether chimerical, and all that he produces to corroborate his Fancy is, that one would think it was (indifferent) by the Weekly licentious Writings of some Gentlemen, who would be thought to be Men of no little Consequence. So then, because some Gentlemen have a licentious Way of Writing (as he terms it) *ergo* the present Establishment is a thing indifferent to the Nation: Has there ever been a Conclusion more absurd or ridiculous? This is the most egregious piece of Nonsense I ever met with; and yet he says, *the Nation is not yet grown quite weary of the Benefit of foreign Trade, or of the Reign of the present Royal Family over us.* Can any one reconcile this Man's Words, and make them consistent with themselves? If there is any meaning in them, they import no more than that the Nation is, and it is not, indifferent in relation to the present Establishment: Such Jargon sure never appeared in print before; but how inconsistent soever his Words are in themselves, he is consistent with himself.

He proceeds further in telling us, *that these valuable Points, (i. e. our foreign Trade, and the present Establishment) were struck at, some by the very Terms, and others by the immediate Consequences, and the secret Articles of the Treaty of Vienna; and that the Forces abovementioned were provided for the Security of our happy Establishment, for the Preservations*

tions of our Rights and Possessions, and of the Peace and Balance of Europe.

If the Treaty of *Vienna* was real, and not fictitious, this Gentleman would have done singular Service to his Countrymen, by telling them what those Terms were in plain *English* which struck at our present Establishment, and what were the Words contained in the *Secret Articles* of that Treaty; but perhaps he was enjoined to *Secrecy* in an Affair of such Consequence, and therefore cannot in Honour reveal it. If this be the Case, he has forfeited his Honour in proceeding to such a length as he has done, and he could not have stained it worse had he disclosed the *Secret* in full. But I hope he will excuse me if I differ from him in my Sentiments relating to this Affair, and give him my Reason for so doing.

Had there been any such *Secret Articles*, no doubt but they must have come to the Knowledge of the King of *Prussia*, if he acceded to this Treaty of *Vienna*; and surely every one will allow that he is so nearly interested in the present Establishment, he would never have gone into Measures so apparently prejudicial to him. But supposing those Articles might have been concealed from his Knowledge, yet when they became publick, he would have certainly withdrawn from such an Alliance, and not have adhered to that which must of necessity have been detrimental to his Interest, or to the Interest

of his House, in case our present Royal Family should be extinct.

If the Security of our *happy Establishment*, &c depends upon the Forces above-mentioned, that is, upon the Twelve thousand *Hessians*, it is absolutely necessary that they should be maintained and supported at our Expence; but sure it will be acknowledged that this is a very poor and slender Security; but I am apt to think that the Hearts of the People of *Great Britain* are esteemed a better Security than the Hearts of Twelve thousand Foreigners purchased with our Money.

From hence the Author goes on to tell us, how the State of the Forces between the Allies of *Vienna* on the one Side, viz. those of the *Emperor*, *Muscovy*, *Russia*, *Spain*, *Prussia*, and the Electors of *Bavaria*, *Palatine*, *Cologne* and *Treves*, on the one Side, which he makes to consist of Three hundred and fifty seven thousand Men, exclusive of the Naval Power of *Spain*: And on the Side of the *Hanover* Treaty, including the *English*, *French*, *Danes*, *Swedes*, *Hanoverians* and *Dutch*, he reckons the Number of their Forces, together with the Twelve thousand hired *Hessians*, to amount to Three hundred and ninety five thousand Men, exclusive of Twenty thousand Seamen on our part, twelve Men of War fitted out by *France*, and of the Preparations made by the *Dutch* for eighteen more. This Account takes up three Pages of his Book.



I am heartily glad that this Gentleman has given us such a fair State of the Forces on both Sides; by which it appears that the Allies of *Hanover* (exclusive of the Twelve thousand *Hessians*) were superior to the Allies of *Vienna* in Number. But admitting a small Deficiency had been wanting, on the part of the Treaty of *Hanover*, sure it was amply recompenced by our vast Superiority over the Allies of *Vienna*, in respect of the Number of our Ships of War and Seamen. So that upon the whole, I do not see how Twelve thousand *Hessians* could secure our Establishment, or that the Preservation of our Rights and Liberties, and of the Peace and Balance of *Europe*, could be said to depend upon them; and if every thing be rightly considered, we may say we were much superior in Number to the Allies of *Vienna*, and consequently had no occasion for hiring the *Hessians*.

This will appear still plainer, if we have recourse to the Difficulties that must necessarily attend the March of the Thirty thousand *Russians*; tho' I am apt to think that the *Emperor* would have found himself disappointed in his dependance on those Troops, when there was, and is still such urgent Occasion for them in their own Country. In all probability the *Czarina* will have need to raise more Forces than she has at present, to maintain the Conquests in *Persia*, if the *Sophy* and the *Sultan* should join their Troops; or if a Peace be concluded between them, and the

the *Sophy* alone should attempt, as it is reasonable to expect he will, the recovery of those Places which have been taken from him. Add to this, that all the Troops of the King of *Prussia*, amounting to Seventy thousand Men, are included in the Number of the Forces of the Allies of *Vienna*; and tho' the Author says, that the Emperor has engaged this King in his Interest, yet he does not say that he is obliged to succour or furnish him with all his Troops.

Having ranged the Troops on both Sides, he then applauds the Councils of the Allies of *Hanover*; to which he gives the Epithets of *Prudent* and *Steady*, because they did not, says he, *provoke and precipitate a War on one hand, while they took care on the other, not to be forced, for fear of a War, and for want of timely Preparations, into base and dishonourable Terms.* I may affirm, that no true *Englishman* would have his Country forced into dishonourable Terms; they have so much of a Martial Spirit in them, that they would resent an Offer of such a kind with the highest Indignation, and would revenge it with the last Drop of their Blood, even without desiring the assistance of hired *Hessians*.

But these Encomiums were brought to favour the Alliance between *England* and *France*; which the Author says, *has been called unnatural and incompatible by some*; and what then? if they were so open and candid as to declare their Sentiments without reserve,

reserve, no doubt but they could produce Reasons that led them to it.

Again, says this Author, *By these prudent and steady Councils, the Galleons (the great Resource of the Emperor, and the King of Spain) were detained in the West Indies, and therefore the Imperial Ministers caused Insinuations to be made to the Hanover Allies, of their Desire to have Matters accommodated in an amicable Manner.*

'Tis true, indeed, that we did detain the Galleons in *Spain*; I own it with a heavy Heart, when I consider how many hundred brave Officers and Sailors perished there for want of Action. If we compute the Expence of that Expedition, the Numbers that were swept away daily, the Charges of our other Forces, and the formidable Appearance of the pacifick *Armada* at *Spithead*, we may reasonably conclude, that we should have been no Losers at the Foot of the Account, if we had pushed on a War with Vigour, which was commenc'd by our good Ally the King of *Spain*, or by his Queen, when the *Spaniards* laid Seige to *Gibraltar*, and committed Depredations on our Merchants Ships in the *West-Indies*, without making Reprisals, tho' we had a sufficient Number of Ships of War there to have procur'd Satisfaction. But to suffer tamely such Insults and Losses were, perhaps, some of the *prudent and steady* Councils of our Allies, or our M——y; or if we had proceeded to commit Hostilities on our Side, in return to those of the *Spaniards*, for  
ought

ought I know they might not have quadrated with those Counsels.

Now we arrive at last to adjust Matters by Way of a Negotiation at a Congress; a Plan of Preliminaries was accordingly framed by the *Hanover* Allies, and sent to *Vienna*; and the Emperor agreed to sign them in *May*, 1727. By this Means, says our Author, *A Stop was put to all Hostilities in Europe*; and yet he tells us about six Lines after, *That Hostilities still continued between Spain and England in the West-Indies, which prevented the Meeting of the Congress*. To this I answer, that our Author, I fear, has palm'd Hostilities upon us, of which we were not guilty, for we were then too pacifickly inclined, and not warm enough in our own Interest; he ought to have said, that *Spain* still continued Hostilities against the *English*, and then he would have spoke the Truth.

Well, let that pass; *England*, he tells us, immediately upon signing the Preliminaries, sent back to *Ireland* Three thousand four hundred twenty eight Men, while the Allies still kept the same Number of Forces on Foot. It would have been a more acceptable piece of News to the People of *England*, if all the *Hessian* Troops had been dismissed, or at least a Number of them equal with those that were sent back to *Ireland*; and I am apt to think that the former would have been carried by a majority of an Hundred to One, had it been put to the Votes of the People in general.

Let



Let us now cast an Eye upon what this doughty Champion of the *Hessian* Troops calls the happy Effects of the Treaty of *Hanover*, and of the prudent Measures and Preparations thereupon; which, according to his Judgment, are as follow: *A War that threatened all Europe was prevented; and a Foundation laid for bringing about a dissolution of that formidable Union between the Emperor and Spain.*

I am loth to suggest that this Gentleman would impose a Falsity upon us, and therefore taking it for granted that what he says is true, *ipso facto*, I congratulate him thereupon. From his own Words then I draw this Inference, *viz.* that as a War was prevented, we had no longer any occasion to maintain the Twelve thousand *Hessians*; that they ought to have been dismissed from our Pay; and then I would desire to know what Reason can be alledged for their being continued to this Day, or why all this Rout should be made in order to procure a Subsidy for maintaining them a Year longer? A convincing Answer, I hope, will be given to these Questions, before our Representatives in Parliament will give their Votes for granting such a Subsidy.

How formidable soever that Union between the *Emperor* and *Spain*, which is said to be dissolved, might have appeared to the Author of this Libel, and to some others, *viz.* the M——y, whose Cause he has laid so much

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to

to Heart, there are many *real* Patriots, who were not under any such dreadful Apprehensions of Danger, as he seems to drive at, even supposing that there had been such an Union. But to avoid all Cavils and Scruples that might arise from thence, and if we allow there had actually been such an Union, yet by our Author's own Confession and Acknowledgment it is *now* dissolved; and therefore I say that there is still the less Reason, or rather no substantial Reason can be given for retaining Twelve thousand *Hessians* in our Service, except we had agreed to continue them in our Pay for a Number of Years certain, which would manifest that they, who made such a Treaty with the *Lindgrave* of *Hess Cassel* plaid a very impolitick Part, highly injurious to the Interest of their Country, and consequently they ought to be called to an Account for such *Mal-Administration*.

In the next *Paragraph* the Author proposes a very *material* Question, which he ought to have weighed and considered thoroughly before he endeavoured to answer it: His main Question to the purpose is, *What occasion was there for any extraordinary Forces*, (I suppose he means the *Hessians*) *after the War was prevented, the Preliminaries signed and ratified, and the Congress opened?* Why truly, in my humble Opinion, we had no occasion for any, and I may venture to affirm I am not singular in my Sentiments.

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But let us hear how *scholastically* this Question is answered. Says he, in answer to this Question, another may be asked: Ridiculous! This is an Evasion, or rather Nonsense *in terminis*. A Question is still a Question; and is there no difference between a Question and Answer? But, as I said before, the Man is consistent with himself; and he who has the least share of Learning must laugh at such an absurd Way of reasoning. However, let us see what he makes of his favourite *Question-Answer*. What did England, says he, or indeed any other Country, ever get by laying down Arms, or disbanding Forces, in order to make Peace? This is a *Petitio Principii*, begging the Question; or what Mr. *Asgill* calls a *Put-Case*. If he will first shew, that England was ever guilty of such an egregious Oversight, Folly or Madness, call it what you will, he shall then have a pertinent Answer, which will be, *Nothing*.

I appeal to every impartial Man living, whether the Question, if fairly stated, ought not to run in these Words: What did England, or any other Country, ever get by carrying on a War, or by making Peace? The Question being thus placed in a clear and proper Light, I answer:

First, as to *England*, she found an Account in it, I mean over the *Left Shoulder*; that is, in plain *English*, she has been a *Loser*. For I will be bold to say, that if we have not been the *Dupes* of Mankind, the *Bubbles* of our

Allies, yet we paid the *Piper* while they danced, or to give it to you in other Words, we beat the Bush while others caught the Game.

Secondly, Tho' the last part of the Question is sufficiently answered, yet to keep our Author in Countenance, I will repeat it in a different Phrase, according to his Method of writing; then, I say, that they have found an Account in it, which has been very much to their Advantage. I must needs own that *England* had the *Honour* of beating their Enemies, taking their Towns, and driving them from one Fortress to another, till at last they were obliged to sue and become Supplicants for Peace: But what recompence had *England* for doing such great and marvellous Things for her Allies, for such Expence as she was at yearly, for the vast Effusion of *English* Blood for ten Years successively? Why truly, she had a few Cannon, which were taken from the Enemy, and some *Standards* and *Colours*, the Trophies of War, whose Remnants may be seen in *Westminster* and *Guild Halls*: All which, upon an Average, will not amount to the hundredth Part of the Value of one *Englishman's* Life. But—We have the *Honour*?—Say you so? Why then we have a *Word*, an empty Sound; and I dare engage that those very Allies for whom we have done such great Things, would freely, and of their own accord, give a thousand times more *Honour* for a thousandth part of the like Benefits which they have received from us.

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To follow the Steps of our Author, he taking it upon trust that his *Question-Answer* is a direct *Answer* to the *Question*, he deduces several Points; the principal of which, worthy of Observation, are, *That upon the Premises laid down by him, the Parliament wisely voted for the Years 1728 and 1729, Twenty two thousand nine hundred fifty five Land Forces, and the continuation of the Twelve thousand Hessians; and then recapitulates and renumerates the Numbers of the Troops of our Allies, &c.*

To this I answer, that no Man will call in question the *Wisdom* of the Nation, which, as a collective Body, is the lower House of Parliament; at least no *wise* Man will do it. But in the Name of *Wisdom*, how comes it to pass this *Wise*, or otherwise Writer, became so well acquainted with the Reasons and Sentiments of the Parliament, as to assure his Readers, that what he has mentioned were the *only* Reasons which induced the Commons to vote for an augmentation of our Forces, and continuation of the *Hessians*? Here is a large scope for Argument, but as I have prescribed certain Limits to myself, with a *ne plus ultra*, I chuse rather to be brief and yet perspicuous, than to be prolix and obscure.

Having drawn a Conclusion from the Premises by him laid down, which, if false, (and I submit them to the Judgment of the Reader) must necessarily be erroneous; he then tells us in the next place, *that Spain had*

*bad ever at Heart the Recovery of Gibraltar.* Why, can any blame them? But I hope their Heads and their Hearts will ach before they recover that important Fortrefs, which was always juſtly reckoned the Key of the *Mediterranean*; and may their Heads and Hearts not only ach, but ſuffer the ſevereſt Pains, who ſhall directly or indirectly conſent to enter into any Treaty, tending to the Delivery or Re-delivery, ſequeſtring or alienation of that Town and Harbour, or any Part or Parcel of it, or of *Port Mahon*, to any Perſons whatſoever.

In the next Place he tells us, *that the Abuses of the Aliento Trade were pretended, and extremely magnified.* What ſhall I ſay to ſuch an audacious and notorious Falſity as this? The Man has certainly a very treacherous Memory, or the moſt unparalleled Stock of Assurance that ever was known: He vaſtly exceeds in this Point an *Hibernian*, nay even a *Scotſman*. To plunder the *South-Sea Company's Ship*, the *Prince Frederick*; to detain her till ſhe grew rotten, and was obliged (with part only of her Cargo, which was returned) to put in at *Antigua*, where, upon a diligent View and Survey, ſhe was adjudged incapable of proceeding on her Voyage to *England*; and whereby the Company (Whigs as well as Tories) ſuffered great Loſs and Damage; beſides many other Inſtances that might be given, are only *pretended Abuses*, according to this Gentleman's aſſertion. This is upon a Parallel with what I have lately read in one of our News Papers, That to make a Man  
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see clear and perfect, there is no better Remedy than to pull out his Eyes.

From what has been quoted from him above, he goes on and says, that the Spaniards were encouraged to bring in question, (he cannot forget that beloved Word) the Recovery of Gibraltar, by the Opposers of the Administration, the pretended (another modest and bosom Companion Word) Patriots of England. All I shall say to this is, that *servabit odorem testa diu*; it has the Taste of the Cask; it is all of the same Piece; and a Carrier's Horse will go on in the old Path, let the Consequence be ever so bad.

In the three succeeding long Paragraphs he leads his Readers a *Wild Goose Chase*; he doubles and redoubles, like a hunted Hare; and in the next Paragraph, all that he says to his purpose, which he had better omitted, is, that what passed at the Congress (of Soissons) to the framing of a Project of a provisional Treaty, is not very material to the present purpose; and then concludes, that the happy Conclusion of the Treaty of Seville occasioned a direct Breach with the Imperial Court.

I agree with this politick Writer that what passed there was not very material; if it had, he would undoubtedly have mentioned it, and plumed himself upon such an advantageous Opportunity. Hence then a Question will naturally arise, if what passed there is  
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not *material* to the purpose, why were our Ministers so blindfold as to be drilled on to continue the Conferences, and to put the Nation to fruitless Expences? but he clears up this, tho' in contradiction to what he had said before in the same Paragraph, that it brought to perfection the *happy* Conclusion of the Treaty of *Seville*.

Where the *Happiness* of this Treaty consists, is at present beyond the View of Mankind; for it is evident to the World that we are more embarrassed and entangled by this Treaty, than we were before it was brought upon the Tapis. I wish we have not *leaped out of the Frying-pan into the Fire*, and should rejoice to find a Clue to lead us out of our Labyrinth. I must own, that I can see no other Prospect for our Deliverance from a bloody and expensive War, (tho' our Author tells us *that the War is prevented*, which is a manifest Falshood) than that the Preparations of the *Turks* for Acts of Hostility will oblige the Emperor to withdraw so many of his Troops from *Italy*, that he cannot be able to oppose the Introduction of six thousand *Spaniards* into that Country, and consequently must accede to the Treaty of *Seville* in that point.

The next thing worth remarking is a second Question, which the Author says he knows will be started by the pretended (I hope he does not mean the *Pretender's*) Patriots; that is, *Where are these Advantages of Peace and of preventing a War, if we still continue*



one at the same Expence as if we were actually in a War? I might answer this Question according to his manner, by asking another, *Where are they indeed?* but I chuse rather to give a direct Answer to this Querist, and therefore say they are in *Nubibus*, or at best but in *Embrio*, and there is great Reason to believe they will become *abortive*.

But let us attend to what he says to this point, *viz. These Words have nothing in them but Sound; the Advantages of Peace by the Security of our Possessions, and the full Enjoyment of our Commerce.* — Do they so? I heartily wish that we were sensible of these valuable Blessings. This Writer asserts Facts to be literally true, which are actually literally false. Are our Possessions secure, when *Spain* has not withdrawn all her Forces from their Camp before *Gibraltar*? Are they secure, when the *Spaniards* are now building, or perhaps have built and erected three large Forts, and sent thither Cannon and all other Warlike Stores of Ammunition? which Forts can command the Bay of *Gibraltar*, and consequently very much annoy, if not sink every Ship that offers to put into that Port.

As to the full Enjoyment of our Commerce I must own it is *equally as true* as the Security of our Possessions: But our Merchants will not only tell you, but prove it also, with heavy Hearts, that the *Spaniards*, notwithstanding they are now our Allies, continue to seize, plunder, and confiscate as many of our Ships of Trade, as they can overpower.

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and oblige to strike to them. So that I hope it is visible we have not as yet reaped any Advantage by the Treaty of *Seville*, or by keeping the *Hessians* in our Pay : However he calls them *preventive Measures*, and tells us, that *altho' the Operations are slow and gentle, they are preferable to the dazzling Glory and Eclat of military Actions, to a trading Nation.*

Here he displays the *Quack*, and the *Wou'd-be-Soldier*, in saying, *Operations may be, and in all probability are too slow, and too gentle ; but to answer him in his own Dialect, I am of Opinion that our Case requires some Scamony, which is rough in its Operation ; otherwise, what is administer'd gently may give an Opportunity to the Distemper to encrease so fast, that it may puzzle the most able State-Physician to remove the Cause. I will be bold to affirm that if the Duke of Marlborough were living, he would be so far from consenting to slow and gentle Operations, that he would immediately make the Cannons roar, and the Bombs fly, as the best and only Specifick in the World to effect a Cure.*

As a further Proof of our Author's Inconsistency, he tells us in Page 31. *That Matters could never have been brought to so good a Situation (an excellent good — for nothing one) if we had basily disbanded the Forces that we had provided, without waiting for the Success of our Negotiations ;* and in Page 34. he cajoles his Reader, by telling him that upon the Conclusion of the Treaty of *Seville* there was an immediate Reduction of above five thousand Men  
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of our British Forces; tho' he told us before that, in effect, to reduce any of our *Quota* of Troops, or to use his own Words, any *Diminution of our Forces would be destructive to the whole Alliance*. I may venture to say, that the People of *England* were not displeased with the Reduction of so many Forces, but they would have been better satisfied, if five thousand of the *Hessians* had been reduced, and our own Subjects been kept on foot.

From hence we come to the Treaty with *Spain*, wherein our Author tells us, that the *Allies of Hanover*, in return for the great *Advantages* they must reap from thence, were obliged by an Article of that Treaty to secure the *Succession of Don Carlos to Tuscany and Parma*, by the effectual Introduction of Spanish Garrisons, to the Number of six thousand Men, into the principal Places of those *Dutchies*.

Here I must beg to make a Break, in order to observe that the great Advantages now mentioned *must* be reaped; we have not hitherto had any, and if we *must* have them, I am too apprehensive it must be by Force of Arms; for that emphatical Word *must* does naturally imply *Force*, or Compulsion in the present Case; and if so, how is the War prevented? how can we answer (to humour this Gentleman in his own way) to our Allies the Reduction of our national Troops?

In the same Paragraph he owns, and I thank him for it, that the *Stipulation for the Introduction of these Spanish Garrisons, to the Num-*

ber of six thousand Men, was a Variation from the Quadruple Alliance, by which the Introduction of neutral Garrisons only (of neutral Forces he should have said) was stipulated for securing that Succession.

By this open and candid Acknowledgment he plainly declares to the World that *we* have infringed the Quadruple Alliance, for which, I believe, the Gentlemen concerned in that Treaty will not return him their Thanks. But the Conduct, says he, (observe how he applies a Salve to this gnawing Sore) of the Emperor, in endeavouring to delay and disappoint the Introduction of neutral Garrisons (again!) and the Succession of *Don Carlos*, sufficiently justified *England* and *France*, in making this Variation without the Consent of the Emperor.

If this Man was Master of as much *Art* as *Front*, he might promise himself Success in his Undertaking, but they who have half an Eye only can discern his false and bare-faced Positions. The Emperor, who, *under the rose*, I look upon to be guilty of much Ingratitude to *England*, has often declared that he will comply with the Articles of the *Quadruple Alliance*, but will not recede from it; he has also declared that he will consent to the Introduction of neutral Troops (not *Garrisons*) of any Nation soever: How then can he be charged with delaying or disappointing the Introduction of them. He does not stand out against neutral Troops, but against *Spanish* Forces; and this is the only Reason why  
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we must come to a War, except some Concessions of the one Side or the other, by way of Expedient, can be brought about in order to prevent it.

To justify this Breach, or in other terms, to fulfil our Engagements with *Spain*, which our Author calls *the Necessity and Prudence of this Measure* (I do not see either the one or the other) will more plainly appear from the following Considerations; (I wish they may, for some affirm that Miracles are not ceased.)

1. The Emperor's Consent must be obtained by way of Negotiation or Force: Sure this Man sets up for a Conjuror! his Meaning in direct Terms is, that if he will not come into, and acquiesce with our Measures, why then we will force him to it. Is not this *bullying* the Emperor?

2. We are obliged to continue the 12000 *Hessians* in our Pay, in respect to our Allies, with whom we are equally concerned to fulfil the Treaty of *Seville*. I must confess that this is very respectful to the *Hessians*, but I am apt to imagine that they would rather have twelve thousand *English* Troops; and what hinders us from keeping such a Number abroad instead of those favourite *Hessians*?

3. That we must execute the Articles with *Spain*, who hath a Right to demand of us the Execution of the Treaty of *Seville* by the Introduction of *Spanish Garrisons*. Garrisons again! Blunder upon Blunder! If these Articles

ticles are consistent with *Justice*, and the Honour of *Great-Britain*, consider what has been said above, then it were but reasonable that we should fulfil our Engagements. But is not *Spain* under some Obligations to perform her Engagements to us? yes, sure; or else we are *duped* with a Witness: Then it is but a Piece of Equity in us to have those Engagements punctually complied with, at or before the time, we execute those on our part.

Nobody denies the Right which *Don Carlos* has to the eventual Succession of *Tuscany* and *Parma*, by the Accession of *Spain* to the Quadruple Alliance; the Emperor allows it, he consents on his part, but the only Obstacle that remains is, that the Queen of *Spain* will have six thousand *Spaniards* introduced into *Italy*, contrary, and in Violation of that Alliance, and the Emperor will not allow any other than six thousand *neutral* Troops, conformable to the said Alliance. If therefore those worthy Patriots, who espouse the Cause of the Queen of— I mean of *Don Carlos*, can justify the Measures which have been taken, they ought to have the Thanks of the Nation returned to them; if they can not, then let them not find fault with other Patriots, who censure and arraign their Conduct in this particular.

From Page 44. to Page 50. our Author fills up those Parts of his Book with what is not very conducive to his first Design; other than endeavouring to vindicate the Support of the *Hessians*, and to throw Dirt at those, who are  
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for having them dismissed, whom he *flily* and convertly make pass for Traytors, but *modestly* calls them Enemies of the Government. He magnifies the Assistance which the Emperor is to receive from *Muscovy*, and yet says it is agreed on all Sides (I use his own Words) that both the *Venetians* and *Muscovites* are under great Apprehensions of the Motions and Dangers of the *Turks*, which must in no small degree effect the Emperor.

If this be the Case, as I readily allow it to be so, then there remains the less Occasion for hiring any longer the Twelve thousand *Hessians*, since there is no probability of receiving Thirty thousand Auxiliaries from *Muscovy*; and therefore I do not see that the continuance of those *Hessians* is for the *Interest*, whatever it may be for the Honour of this Kingdom, as he says in pag. 50. or *that the disbanding them*, he means discharging such an Incumbrance, which he mentions in pag. 51. *would be to dissolve the present Alliance.*

In his penultimate Paragraph he exerts himself as *strenuously*, as any *weak* Man can possibly do. In his last Paragraph he exclaims bitterly against those who are the chief Authors and Promoters (as he terms them) of the furious Clamour against the *Hessian* Troops; and then he concludes with cajoling some of those very People who are averse to the continuation of the *Hessians*, by saying *that several well-meaning Persons have been led away by an artful Misrepresentation of this Point;*

*Point*; that is, he has used all the *Art* he has, to vindicate the Maintenance of the *Hessians*, and the Gentlemen of the other Side have not used *Art*, but have had recourse to *Reason*, *Argument* and *Justice*, shewing the Necessity for dismissing them for our Pay; I would have said *Service*, but I know not any they have done to us. But his last Sentence is very remarkable, *that if none but they have the same Views and Designs with the pretended Patriots, will be drawn into the Snares that are daily laid for them, these impotent and malicious Efforts to distress the Government at home will prove as vain and ineffectual as their Endeavours have been in all Foreign Courts, to embarrass and obstruct the Measures concerted for the Interest and Advantage of the King and Kingdom.*

Is not this a very civil and pathetic Conclusion? The Substance of this long Period is nothing less, forsooth, than to stigmatize, by the Name of pretended Patriots, the major Part of the Kingdom; charging them with Facts which he has not offered to prove, and which never entered into their Hearts; endeavouring to render them odious to the rest of their Fellow-Subjects, as Incendiaries and Malecontents, without the least shadow of Reason, but merely by his own matchless Impudence and false Accusations.

**F I N I S.**





